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William A. Callahan,1 Textualizing Cultures: Thinking Beyond the 




This essay examines how the MIT Controversy hardened identities in terms of the time-
worn template of geopolitical conflict of national stereotypes. It critically analyzes the 
Chinese students’ response to the “Visualizing Cultures” project by putting it in the 
context of the PRC’s patriotic education policy that securitizes culture by focusing on 
identity as difference in a zero-sum game that distinguishes civilization from barbarism, 
and China from the rest of the world. It critically analyzes the professors response to the 
controversy by highlighting how meaning is not only produced by the author; it is also 
consumed by various audiences that bring diverse sets of experiences into meaning-
making. It concludes that the controversy is less about content, and more about who 
controls knowledge production and distribution. 
Keywords: China, patriotic education, race, narrative, culture 
 
On Sunday April 23, 2006, the “Spotlight” section of MIT’s homepage was linked to the 
university’s NEH prize-winning “Visualizing Cultures” project, which uses Japanese 
images to critically narrate modern East Asian history and politics. Within forty-eight 
hours MIT was forced to shut down the site, according to Peter Perdue’s chronology.3 
Hundreds of emails from outraged Chinese around the world had complained about a 
wood-block print of a Japanese soldier decapitating a Chinese prisoner in the first Sino-
Japanese war (1894-95).4 To some, the image “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” 
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because it celebrated Japanese racism and militarism. This issue became a cause célèbre 
in the Chinese-language press, and the two professors who created the site, John Dower 
and Shigeru Miyagawa, received emails so threatening that the police were called in. 
MIT’s mainland Chinese graduate students’ association, which led the campaign, 
demanded that the website’s offending image be put in the “proper historical context” 
with “accessible explanations”—or be shut down for good.  
 After apologizing for any emotional distress, Dower and Miyagawa responded that 
the website’s accompanying text did just that, and underlined how their “intent was to 
illuminate aspects of the human experience—including imperialism, racism, violence and 
war—that we must confront squarely if we are to create a better world.”5 The website 
went back on-line a few days later, and included a warning at the gateway to the 
controversial webpage: “PLEASE VIEW AND USE THESE ‘VISUALIZING 
CULTURES’ UNITS CAREFULLY AND IN THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THEY HAVE 
BEEN PREPARED.”6 
 While the participants might characterize the “Visualizing Cultures” incident as a 
struggle between “defending academic freedom” and “avoiding hurting the feelings of 
the Chinese people,” I think controversy here is more about who controls knowledge 
production and distribution, either in terms of asserting the “proper historical context” or 
limiting understanding to “THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN PREPARED.”  
Although it is easy to sympathize with the outrage at the violence of the Japanese 
woodblock prints, we should note that violent images are an important part of Chinese 
popular discourse.7 There are numerous examples of Chinese war propaganda that 
celebrate Chinese violence against Japan during World War II (otherwise known as the 
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Anti-Japanese War). A patriotic banner from that conflict, for example, pictures a heroic 
Chinese soldier holding up a decapitated Japanese head as a trophy. This silk poster, 
which was painted at the Chinese Communist Party’s Lu Xun Academy of Art and 
Literature in Yan’an, declares (in Chinese and English) that its goal is “To wipe out our 
humiliation with our enemy’s blood.”8 
 
Fig. 1: Chinese war propaganda 
Source: William A. Callahan 
 
 Dehumanized images of Japanese as barbarians continue to be the stock-in-trade of 
the PRC’s mediascape. In 2012, sixty percent of the films and television shows made at 
China’s premier Hengdian World Studios were about the Anti-Japanese War, and around 
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700 million Japanese people were killed in all Chinese films that year.9 (The total 
population of Japan was estimated at 127,650,000 in 2012.) As one Chinese actor 
recounted, “I play a shameful Japanese soldier in a way that when people watch, they feel 
he deserves to die. I get bombed in the end.”10 In 2000, Jiang Wen’s film Devils on the 
Doorstep, which is about a Japanese POW in China who is befriended by Chinese 
villagers, won the Cannes Grand Prix. But it was censored in China because, as the Film 
Censorship Committee explained, “the Chinese civilians don’t hate the Japanese” man 
enough; rather, they are as “close as brothers” with him.11 Back in the nonfiction world, 
when a few prominent journalists and scholars suggested in 2002-04 that China pursue a 
“normal” relationship with Japan that did not simply dwell on “the history question,” they 
were publicly denounced as traitors to the Han race (Hanjian)—and even received death 
threats.12  
 Commentaries that seek to explain the position of Chinese students in the Visual 
Cultures controversy often instruct us to put the horrible images in the context of China 
and Japan’s sad history in the long twentieth century. Most discussions of the “history 
issue” outline the problems with Japan’s biased history textbooks, semi-official denials 
and half-hearted apologies. But the problems of Japanese textbooks should be put into 
perspective: the history textbook that generated massive protests in China and South 
Korea in 2001 and 2005 was adopted by less than one percent of school districts.13 Hence 
in a way, the “history problem” is more a media event than a pedagogical issue—a media 
event that is recirculated as much by Chinese reactions (both official and unofficial) as it 
is by Japan’s rightwing politicians and intellectuals. While it is necessary to recognize the 
horror of Japanese atrocities in the World War II, and criticize those who deny them, here 
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I have a different goal: to interrogate the pivotal role of violent images in narratives of 
Chinese identity and security. 
 To understand the import and influence of China’s own pedagogy of violence, we 
need to put the horrible images of the Visualizing Cultures controversy in the context of 
China’s patriotic education campaign, which involves textbooks and curricula for all 
levels of education, and includes mass media activities in museums, film, television, 
popular magazines, newspapers, and on official holidays. Deng Xiaoping instituted this 
campaign in late 1989 because he realized that loyalty to the party-state was not natural; 
China’s youth needed to be taught how to be patriotic. In a speech to top generals on June 
9, 1989, Deng concluded that “during the last ten years our biggest mistake was made in 
the field of education, primarily in ideological and political education—not just of 
students but of the people in general.”14 The solution to this education problem was to 
shift the focus of youthful energies away from the domestic issues that defined the 1989 
student movement to target foreign problems. The CCP thus formulated a patriotic 
education policy not so much to re-educate the youth (as in the past), as to redirect 
protest towards the foreigner as the primary enemy. 
Patriotic education thus does more than celebrate the glories of civilization and 
revolution in China; it also includes a heavy dose of what is called “national humiliation 
education” that commemorates China’s defeats.15 This moral tale, however, does not 
mention tragedies that have rocked the PRC since 1949: the Great Famine, the ten lost 
years of the Cultural Revolution, or the June 4, 1989 massacre. Rather than focus on the 
party-state’s problems, the discourse of “Century of National Humiliation” (1840-1949) 
knits together all of the negative events—invasions, massacres, military occupations, 
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unequal treaties, and economic extractions—of pre-revolutionary history that can be 
blamed on outsiders. As the result of a combination of foreign invasions and corrupt 
Chinese regimes, patriotic education texts tell us how sovereignty was lost, territory 
dismembered, and the Chinese people thus humiliated. Such books narrate how China 
went from being at the center of the world, to the “Sick Man of East Asia” after the 
Opium War, only to rise again with the triumphant foundation of the PRC.16 Patriotic 
education thus draws thick moral boundaries between patriotic Chinese on the one hand, 
and evil foreigners and Chinese race traitors on the other.  
Indeed, like with the Visualizing Cultures controversy in 2006, national humiliation 
discourse itself first emerged to explain China’s shocking defeat in the first Sino-
Japanese war (1894-95): in a memorial to the throne, Kang Youwei described this loss as 
China’s “greatest humiliation in more than two hundred years since the advent of the 
Qing dynasty, and aroused the indignation of all the officials and people of the 
country.”17 This defeat was shocking because it reversed power relations; before the first 
Sino-Japanese war, Chinese saw Japan as a student of Chinese civilization. Now many 
Chinese people see Japan as a barbaric “country of ingratitude” because it turned on its 
teacher while still refusing to face up to its horrible crimes from the twentieth century.18  
Sino-Japanese identity politics are still framed to a considerable extent by the 
Nanjing massacre (also known in English as “the Rape of Nanking”): a horrific series of 
atrocities committed by the imperial Japanese army as it invaded and occupied the 
Chinese capital.19 For the six weeks between 13 December 1937 and late January 1938 
Japanese soldiers killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and POWs, and raped over 
20,000 women. Since the 1980s (and especially with the patriotic education campaign 
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after 1989), the party-state has worked to turn a scattered collection of specific memories 
of the Nanjing massacre into lasting national institutions: numerous museums and feature 
films, dozens of commemorative photo albums and hundreds of illustrated articles.20 The 
main purpose of these media products is to document the truth about the Nanjing 
massacre, often through the “undeniable evidence” of iconic photographs of mutilated 
Chinese bodies, especially beheaded men and raped women.21 Starting in the 1990s these 
haunting images spread out into cyberspace, up-loaded onto the military websites of 
official security studies think tanks in China, as well as patriotic websites maintained by 
transnational Chinese groups. When posted on the web these free-floating images are 
separated from any context that would help us to understand their meaning—except as a 
provocation for the raw hatred of foreigners as devils. On the military website these 
graphic pictures have only short captions like, “Never forget national humiliation: 
Chinese women raped by Japanese devils” and “Never forget national humiliation: 
slaughtering our compatriots.”22 The purpose of such photo albums is not merely to 
provide objective evidence of Japanese war crimes, but to reproduce the gendered 
discourse of female victims that stokes desire for masculine military revenge. More 
generally, the reproduction and recirculation of mutilated Chinese bodies in Chinese texts 
suggests that nationalism is in many ways defined against a standard of (Japanese) 
barbarism, more than with a standard of (Chinese) civilization.  
While national humiliation discourse is not always obvious, it is omnipresent in 
the background as a template that guides China’s national aesthetic. Stories of China’s 
civilization and humiliation are not only about past history; they provide the frame for 
understanding China’s current foreign relations that inflames popular feelings for future 
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demonstrations, and primes the indignant youth for explosive protests. It is common for 
people to suggest that national humiliation discourse is on the wane; but I have found it 
keeps reemerging to make sense of each new challenge to Chinese identity. More 
importantly, Xi Jinping’s new “China Dream” discourse is heavily invested in national 
humiliation themes. Xi first uttered his new catchphrase after a tour of the National 
Museum’s “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibit, which is ground-zero for national humiliation 
discourse. In this and later speeches, Xi’s clarified that his dream of a strong country is a 
“rejuvenation” from bitter history of the Century of National Humiliation.23  
The conclusion is not that Chinese students have been “brainwashed” by this 
impressive multimedia campaign (that still continues to this day) or are “pawns of larger 
forces,” but to suggest that patriotic education/national humiliation education provides 
the dominant template for understanding Chinese identity and security. China’s 
diplomats, scholars and students often exude national pride when times are good, but 
quickly switch to national humiliation themes when China faces an international crisis.  
In other words, if it is common for us to assume that the “general public” can be 
influenced by the media in the United States, why is it so difficult to accept that Chinese 
citizens, whose subjectivity emerges in the context of well-organized official media 
campaigns, cannot be likewise influenced? And isn’t it a proper critical stance to treat the 
“Century of National Humiliation” as a discourse that needs to be explained in terms of 
power relations, rather than as a source of “facts” that will explain China’s behaviour? 
Elsewhere, I conclude that the “Century of National Humiliation” is less important as a 
set of facts than as a structure of feeling that guides a certain form of politics. It is 
necessary, then, to understand national humiliation not because it is “true,” but because 
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understanding it is helpful for critiquing this particular narrative of hostile international 
politics.24 Certainly, individual Chinese express a wide range of views about their identity 
and history; but it is still important to understand the discursive economy of the PRC’s 
propaganda system that not only censors information but also actively shapes all forms of 
education and entertainment.25 
 Against the background of the graphic display of mutilated Chinese bodies—
including horrible photos of Japanese soldiers beheading Chinese men and raping 
Chinese women—that are commonly displayed in discussions of the Nanjing massacre in 
the PRC, it might seem odd that Chinese students would complain about the prints 
picturing beheadings of Chinese soldiers on MIT’s homepage. But that would be missing 
the point; the controversy is not about outrage at the violence of the images or the 
meaning of the individual photos and prints. It centers on the production and distribution 
of Visualizing Cultures.  
 Although they might unproblematically consume the “war porn” of Nanjing 
massacre albums at home in China, when abroad some felt that it was their duty to assert 
control over images of ethnic Chinese people. As one student put it, he and his classmates 
were angry “not [at] the images themselves, but the lack of a ‘righteous’ standpoint.”26 
The “righteous” standpoint, he explains, is the one supported by the Chinese state, i.e. 
patriotic education. As the internet discussion shows, activists were particularly enraged 
that one of the authors had a Japanese-sounding name, thus reaffirming the securitization 
of China against Japan.27 Securitization here involves a focus on identity as difference in 
a zero-sum game that distinguishes civilization from barbarism, and China from the rest 
of the world.  
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  We saw such popular passions erupt again in 2008, when Chinese citizens came 
out in force to defend the Olympic Torch Relay’s international “Journey of Harmony” 
against “foreigners” who criticized Beijing’s crackdown in Tibet. Rather than examine 
why Tibetans might protest Beijing’s rule, the dominant discourse among Han Chinese 
around the world narrated the “bias” of Westerners who had unfairly criticized the 
Chinese homeland. The Tibetan unrest was thus transformed from a serious domestic 
issue of racial politics into an international issue of pride and humiliation that pits China 
against the West.  
 Beijing responded to international criticism in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics with 
a propaganda campaign that narrated “the real China” (zhenshi de Zhongguo) that 
Chinese officials and netizens expected foreign journalists to report.28 As China has 
grown in global power over the past few years, this media campaign to present a singular 
correct view of the PRC to international audiences has gained much traction: Confucius 
Institutes are proliferating in universities around the world and China’s new English 
language cable news channel, CNTV, spreads the word in a slick CNN-style. The 
importance of China’s “image policy” was reaffirmed at the 2011 annual meeting of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which focused on developing 
China’s soft power and “cultural security.”29  
Knowledge here shifts from being the product of expertise—i.e. the result of 
scholarly enquiry—to be the product of emotional feeling that one can only properly 
appreciate through direct experience.30 It becomes a national commodity, an issue of 
national sovereignty and discursive power (huayu quan), where all Chinese, as a young 
Chinese diplomat recently told me, “instinctively” know the meaning of “harmony,” the 
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PRC’s recently declared national value. It becomes “racialized” in the sense that only 
“Chinese” can talk about China (or at least have editorial control about how others 
discuss it, as the Chinese students’ association suggested). This sense of control 
sometimes takes blunt forms: the Chinese consulate in Manchester denied visas to any of 
the 50,000 people who worked or studied at the University for ten weeks in 2011; among 
other things, the consul-general was insulted by the critical discussion of China at a 
keynote speech that was sponsored by the Confucius Institute (and now is published as 
one of the articles in this special issue of positions).31 
This argument of Chinese discursive sovereignty makes sense to postcolonial 
theorists who focus their critique on U.S. dominance of media and academic discourse. 
But since China is a growing global power—it is the no. 2 economy in the world, and is 
forecast to surpass the U.S. as early as 2015—I think that it is necessary to be critical of 
China’s cultural politics as well. One of the aims of postcolonial theory is to question 
EuroAmerica’s singular universalizing (self) definition of modernity, with a goal of 
promoting a more diverse set of views of the world.32 The intellectual trend in China, 
however, is going in the opposite direction to valorize “unity.” China’s futurologists are 
promoting the classical ideal of Great Harmony (datong) in books as diverse as 
philosopher Zhao Tingyang’s The Tianxia System, political scientist Pan Wei’s The 
China Model, economist Hu Angang’s 2030 China, and scholar-diplomat Zhang Wei-
wei’s China Shock.33  
 What does Great Harmony mean here? Descriptions are generally vague; but 
Pan’s detailed outline in The China Model gives us some clues. He argues that the 
patriarchal values of village life, which is presented as a conflict-free organic society, are 
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the source of the PRC’s economic success. Pan sees the PRC as village society writ large, 
where the party loves the people like a caring father, and the masses are loyal, grateful 
and respectful, like good children. There is no room in this national village for open 
debate in “civil society.” Pan actually condemns civil society as the battleground of 
special interests that can only serve to divide the organic whole. For him, diversity is 
“division,” and thus a problem that needs to be solved by the state. Unity here is the 
guiding value because Pan sees social order as a process of integrating divisions into the 
organic whole, ultimately into the World of Great Harmony.34 Great Harmony thus is 
better understood according to its more literal translation: great unity, which does not 
allow much opportunity for diversity. Indeed, as the demands of Chinese students at MIT 
show, it involves “harmonizing” things that challenge Sinocentric views of the world. 
 The responses of professors (including Peter Purdue), who presented themselves as 
“experts,” were also problematic at times. Dower and Miyagawa’s explanations that 
continually point to their written text show how they do not appreciate the power of the 
visual images. While the Chinese students denounced the Visualizing Cultures website 
for not putting the images in the proper context, Dower responded that he actually had 
described the prints in question as shocking, racist and gruesome. Yet these beautiful 
wood-block prints aestheticize the violence; like with the photo albums of horrible 
pictures that commemorate the Nanjing massacre that are popular in China, the graphic 
scenes overwhelm Dower and Miyagawa’s critical written text. The graphic images 
clearly overwhelmed any statement of “authorial intent.”  
To appreciate the politics of display, it is helpful to consider Mieke Bal’s analysis 
of The Colonial Harem, a slick picture album by Malek Alloula that gathers together 
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postcard photos of semi-naked Algerian women taken by French colonial officials from 
1900 to 1930. Bal agrees that Alloula has the proper critical intent: to analyze the cultural 
politics of empire. But she argues that employing visual texts of naked women to engage 
in this critique is problematic. Rather than reading photographs individually, she 
highlights the importance of understanding how they are produced and distributed in 
photogenic albums. When the coffee table “technology” displays semi-naked Others, she 
argues, it risks complicity in reproducing the very ideology that it intends to oppose.  
Gathered together in a beautifully-crafted book, Alloula’s collection of postcards 
encourages a voyeuristic consumption that serves “to aestheticize the images and thus to 
anesthetize their conflicts.”35 The core problem of critical pictorials and exhibitions, Bal 
argues, is “the combination of exuberant illustration with poverty of explanation.”36 
Indeed, it is easy to miss critical points written in the text because we usually browse 
through coffee table books focusing on the visual narrative. (A temptation that is even 
more powerful on the Internet.) Rather than reproducing hundreds of photos, Bal suggests 
that we employ “a thoughtful, sparse use of visual material where every image is 
provided with an immediately accessible critique that justifies its use with specificity.” 
This critical strategy needs to stress the “narrative dimension of images” in terms of “the 
way the story of reading the image happens.” Thus the rigidity and fixity of the images 
can be loosened in a way that allows multiple meanings to emerge.37  
 Since highlighting Visualizing Cultures on MIT’s homepage turned this academic 
project into a coffee table book, it is not difficult to understand how some people were 
offended by the images posted on the website. It also highlights how meaning is not only 
produced by the author; it is also consumed by various audiences that bring diverse sets 
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of experiences into meaning-making. If authors want readers to focus on the written text, 
then they should take Bal’s commentary to heart and minimize the visual display.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Du Lala at work 
Source: Screenshot of “Du Lala shengji zi,” 2010 
 
Perhaps the saddest thing about the MIT controversy is how it hardened identities 
in terms of the time-worn template of geopolitical conflict. Rather than seeing themselves 
as, for example, historians and engineers, many participants were reduced to national 
stereotypes: “Chinese” versus “Americans.” Xu Jinglei’s blockbuster film “Go Lala Go” 
(“Du Lala shengzhi ji,” 2010) provides an interesting alternative model of transnational 
and transcultural engagement. This movie traces the career of Lala, a Chinese 
“everywoman” from the post-1980s generation, as she pursues a “Chimerican dream” 
that knits together Chinese and American individuals, rules, aspirations and values. In 
other words, it shows how people can work together for mutual benefit.  
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